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Access to D ta Across Borders:
The Critical oe for Con ress
to Play Now
Jennifer Daskal
n December 2013, the government served a warrant on Microsoft, demanding
emails associated with a particular email account. Microsoft refused to comply.
The data was stored on a server in Dublin, Ireland, and according to Microsoft,
the demand was an impermissible exercise of the government's warrant authority. The
government fought back, arguing that Microsoft, as a Washington-based company,
could access the data from within the United States, and that this was therefore a ter-
ritorial-and perfectly permissible-exercise of its authority.
At the heart of the dispute is the Stored Communications Act (SCA), a more than
20-year old statute that both protects the privacy of and regulates the disclosure of
stored communications content.' The statute, written before there was any such thing
as the global Internet, is silent as to its territorial reach. Under longstanding Supreme
Court precedent, this means that it is to be interpreted as if it only applies within the
territory of the United States. 2 But that leaves open the key question presented by
what is now known as the "Microsoft Ireland case": Does the location of the data or
the location of the provider that discloses the data control? Microsoft contends it is
the former, while the government asserts the latter. The case is now pending before
the Supreme Court.3
Federal magistrate and district court judges in the Southern District of New York
sided with the government, but the Second Circuit reversed.4 The result, at least for the
Second Circuit: U.S. warrant authority only extends to data stored within the United
States, even if the crime is local, the target of the investigation is local, and the only
foreign government nexus to the data is that the data happens to be stored in that
foreign government's jurisdiction. If there isn't a workable framework for cooperation
with the relevant foreign government or if law enforcement can't actually identify the
relevant data location, the government is simply out of luck; there may be no way for
law enforcement to lawfully compel production of the data, no matter how serious the
This Issue Brief was initially published in October 2017.
1 18 U.S.C. 55 2701-2712 (2012).
2 See, e.g., Morrison v. Nat'l Australia Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 255 (2010) (emphasizing the "long-
standing principle of American law that 'legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."') (citations omitted).
3 See United States v. Microsoft, 2017 WL 2869958 (Mem) (Sup. Ct. Oct. 16, 2017) (granting cert).
4 See In re Warrant to Search A Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft,
829 F.3d 197, 201-02 (2d Cir. 2016); In re Warrant to Search A Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft, 855 F.3d 53, 54 (2d Cir. 2017) (denying rehearing en banc).
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crime. Even the judge who authored the Second Circuit's opinion recognized that this
was not a satisfactory result and urged Congress to step in and update the statute.5
Meanwhile, a handful of magistrates and district court judges have come out the
other way in analogous disputes involving Google and Yahoo!, ordering the tech com-
panies to disclose customer data stored overseas.6 But this result creates problems as
well: It essentially says that the U.S. can compel the production of any and all data
under the control of a U.S.-based provider, without regard to the potentially legitimate
countervailing interests of foreign governments. This sets a concerning precedent that,
if adopted widely, would make it harder for the United States to safeguard the data of
its own citizens and residents and likely undercut privacy on a global scale. Such rulings
also undercut U.S. business interests-which will find it harder to compete globally if
and when they are perceived (rightly or wrongly) as a gateway for U.S. surveillance.
With the Supreme Court poised to hear the case, the need for congressional action
is greater than ever. The Court is presented with the same stark choice that has faced
the lower courts: Either Microsoft wins, and U.S. law enforcement access to data turns
on the happenstance of where it happens to be held. Or the government wins, and it
can compel the production of data anywhere, without any statutory obligation to take
into account countervailing considerations, including the potential legitimate interest
of foreign governments in safeguarding the data of their citizens and residents. Neither
is a satisfactory result.
Meanwhile, other provisions of the SCA are causing significant problems for foreign
law enforcement when investigating criminal activity involving data that happens to
be U.S.-held. This is due to provisions that preclude U.S.-based companies from disclos-
ing stored communications content, such as emails, to foreign law enforcement, regard-
less of the equities in a particular case. 7 Consider, for example, U.K. law enforcement
seeking emails of an alleged U.K.-based perpetrator in a London murder involving a
U.K.-based victim. If the alleged perpetrator used a U.K.-based email service provider,
the U.K. officials would likely be able to access that data within weeks, if not days or
hours. If, however, he were using Gmail or another U.S.-based provider, the U.K. officials
would need to make a diplomatic request for the data-what is known as a "mutual
legal assistance request"-and then wait for the United States to respond. This is a
s In re Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft, 855
F. 3d at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) ("It is overdue for a congressional revision [to the SCA] that would
continue to protect privacy but would more effectively balance concerns of international comity with
law enforcement needs and service provider obligations in the global context in which this case arose.")
6 See In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 17-mj-532 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 2017), slip op. 23; In
re Search Warrant No. 16-960-M-1 to Google, No. 16-960, 2017 WL 3535037, at *11 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 17,
2017), aff 'g 232 F. Supp. 3d 708 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 3, 2017); In re Search of Content Stored at Premises
Controlled by Google Inc., No. 16-mc-80263, 2017 WL 3478809, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017), aff 'g
2017 WL 1487625 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2017); In re Search of Information Associated with [redacted]@
gmail.com That is Stored at Premises Controlled by Google, Inc., No. 16-mj-757, 2017 WL 3445634, at
*27 (D.D.C. July 31, 2017), aff 'g 2017 WL 2480752(D.D.C. June 2, 2017); In re Search of Information
Associated with Accounts Identified as [redacted]@gmail.com, No. 16-mj-2197, 2017 WL 3263351, at
*9 (C.D. Cal. July 13, 2017); In re Search Warrant to Google, Inc., No. 16-4116, 2017 WL 2985391, at
*12 (D.N.J. July 10, 2017); In re Two Email Accounts Stored at Google, Inc., No. 17-M-1235, 2017 WL
2838156, at *4 (E.D. Wis. June 30, 2017); In re Search of Premises Located at [Redacted] @yahoo.com,
No. 17-mj-1238 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 7,2017), slip op. 3.
7 The SCA prohibits providers from turning over the content of communications, except in a limited
number of situations. See 18 U.S.C. 55 2702,2703(a) (2016). While a "governmental entity" may compel
such production, pursuant to a lawfully issued warrant, governmental entity is defined as "a department
or agency of the United States or any State or political subdivision thereof." 18 U.S.C. 5 2711(4) (2012).
Thus, foreign governments do not qualify.
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lengthy process, requiring multiple Department of Justice reviews and a U.S. attorney
to ultimately obtain a U.S. warrant for the data based on the U.S. standard of "probable
cause" before transmitting the data to the U.K., a process that has been estimated to
take an average of ten months and in many cases much longer. This is so even if the
only U.S. nexus to the crime is that the data happens to be U.S.-held.
Foreign law enforcement organizations chafe at the notion that they have to employ
U.S. process to access data sought in the investigation of local crime involving non-
U.S. citizens that are located outside the United States. And their investigations are
stymied as a result. They are thus incentivized to pursue a range of concerning
responses, including the following: the unilateral extraterritorial assertion of their
own compulsory disclosure obligations, thereby putting companies in the middle of a
potential conflict of laws, having to decide which law to comply with and which to
violate; mandatory-and costly-data localization measures, policies that require
data to be maintained locally as a way of ensuring access to it; and pursuit of alterna-
tive, and often surreptitious, means of accessing the data, including expanded lawful
hacking authority and pursuit of broad decryption mandates.
In fact, finding a solution to this problem is described by U.K. diplomats as one of
the top diplomatic priorities of the United Kingdom vis-A-vis the United States. The
U.K.'s Deputy National Security Advisor, Paddy McGuinness, has now testified in both
the House and the Senate on the issue-highlighting its importance to the U.K. gov-
ernment. 0 And while the United States and United Kingdom have drafted an agreement
that would facilitate U.K. access to data of non-U.S. citizens and residents in the inves-
tigation of serious crime, subject to baseline substantive and procedural requirements,
the agreement cannot be implemented without legislation amending the SCA.
The good news is that these issues have now been the subject of hearings and leg-
islative efforts in the House and Senate. Of note, Senators Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and
Christopher Coons (D-DE) and Representatives Tom Marino (R-PA) and Suzan
DelBene (D-WA) have introduced legislation in their respective chambers-the
International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA)n"-which is designed to address the
problem identified in the Microsoft Ireland litigation. While there is room for improve-
ment (as discussed in more detail below), the legislation is an important starting point
that shifts the focus away from the location of data to the location and identity of the
target as a key factor in determining jurisdiction. Importantly, it mandates that the
U.S. government obtain a warrant before accessing communications content. This is
The President's Review Group on Intelligence and Communication Technologies, Liberty and
Security in a Changing World 226-229 (Dec. 12, 2013), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/
default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg-final-report.pdf. See also Vivek Krishnamurthy, "Cloudy with a
Conflict of Laws: How Cloud Computing Has Disrupted the Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty System
and Why It Matters," Berkman Klein Center Research Publication No. 2016-3 (Feb. 18, 2016), https://
ssrn.com/abstract=2733350 (highlighting problems with the mutual legal assistance system).
9 For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data
Across Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 473 (2016).
10 See Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders: Facilitating Cooperation and
Protecting Rights Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. on Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Paddy McGuinness), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/
meetings/law-enforcement-access-to-data-stored-across-borders-facilitating-cooperation-and-protect-
ing-rights; Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Paddy McGuinness),
https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/McGuinness-Testimony.pdf.
11 S. 1671, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); H.R. 5323, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2016).
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something already being done as a matter of practice and is required as a matter of
law in the Sixth Circuit; codifying this rule would ensure its continued application. 12
Draft legislation designed to allow the U.S.-U.K. agreement to be implemented and
to allow for analogous agreements with other rights-respecting nations has been sent
from both the Trump and Obama administrations to Capitol Hill." Specifically, the
draft legislation would authorize the executive branch to enter into executive agree-
ments with foreign governments that would permit, on a reciprocal basis, direct access
to the communications content of foreigners located outside the United States, so long
as a long list of substantive and procedural safeguards are met. Here, too, there is
room for improvement, as also discussed below. But as a whole, it is an approach that
Congress should endorse-and adopt.
In this Issue Brief, I examine these issues in more detail-providing additional
detail on the problem, the need for congressional involvement, and the ideal legislative
path forward.
It should be said at the outset that this Issue Brief addresses only one piece of SCA
reform that is needed-namely the problems and challenges associated with access to
data across borders. Separate bills are also pending that would, among other things,
set procedural and substantive rules governing the acquisition of geo-location data;
set much-needed time limits on the use of so-called "gag orders," which prevent service
providers from informing their customers that their data has been accessed by the
government; and codify the warrant requirement for communications content (in the
event it is not clarified as part of these cross-border reforms).14 These are all pieces of
the SCA that also need updating.
I. THE SOURCE OF THE PROBLEM
Until relatively recently, evidence sought in the investigation of local crime tended
to be locally held. Of course, exceptions existed-when, for example, a sophisticated
criminal ring spirited stolen goods across borders. But those cross-border moves took
a great deal of effort. And for the most part local officials investigating local criminal
activity could look locally. They could obtain a warrant for, say, the house or office
of a suspect, and, if available, find the sought-after evidence nearby-certainly within
the state's territorial jurisdiction. And even if the suspect were making phone calls to
conspirators across a territorial border, law enforcement could listen in to those com-
munications as they crossed local telecommunications networks.
12 See U.S. v. Warshak, 631 F. 3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010) (holding that "[t]he government may not
compel a commercial ISP to turn over the contents of a subscriber's emails without first obtaining a war-
rant based on probable cause").
13 Data Stored Abroad: Ensuring Lawful Access and Privacy Protection in the Digital Era: Hearing
Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Richard W. Downing, Acting
Deputy Assistant Attorney General), https://judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Downing-
Testimony.pdf. Almost identical draft legislation introduced by the Obama Administration is available
here: https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/2994379-2016-7-15-US-UK-Biden-With-Enclosures.
html#document/pl/. Specifically, the draft legislation requires an Attorney General-issued certification
that the "domestic law of the foreign government, including the implementation of that law, affords
robust substantive and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties in light of the data collection
and activities of the foreign government that will be subject to the agreement" and lists a number of
factors to be considered in making this determination, including whether the foreign government "dem-
onstrates respect for the rule of law and non-discrimination."
14 See, e.g., ECPA Modernization Act of 2017, S. 1657. 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); see also H.R.
387, 115th Cong. 5 4 (1st Sess. 2017); see also Email Privacy Act, S. 1654, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017).
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But the rise of a globally interconnected communications network, coupled with
the growing use of encrypted communications technology, has changed that reality.
Increasingly, sought-after data is neither locally held nor locally accessible. Rather,
law enforcement increasingly finds itself seeking data stored across borders, even in
the investigation of a local crime.
Consider for example a resident of France who uses Gmail. Her data is not likely
to be stored in France. In fact, it is likely moved around with some frequency, very
likely across multiple borders. Even if it transits through France, it is likely to be
encrypted en route. Moreover, these locational choices are made by a third-party
provider-in this case Google-that manages her data and moves it around for reasons
of efficiency, tax purposes, and energy costs. There may be absolutely no connection
between the French resident and where her data happens to be held-other than the
fact that a private company decided to put it there. The same is true for U.S. users-as
well as most users around the world.
The law has not caught up to the reality. The drafters of the SCA were writing
before there was a global Internet. Their silence as to its territorial scope reflected the
world as they knew it at that time. They simply couldn't have imagined the kind of
globally interconnected Internet that exists today, with data crossing borders across
the globe at the speed of light, sometimes stored in multiple places simultaneously,
sometimes divided and distributed across multiple jurisdictions, and largely based on
the business decisions of third-party providers. The drafters never grappled with the
complicated jurisdictional issues that this reality generates.
Given the silence of the statute, the Second Circuit applied the long-standing
assumption that location of property (in this case data) delimits territorial jurisdiction.
But such a data location-driven approach to jurisdiction fails to reflect the underlying
normative interests that this long-standing rule is meant to protect.
Consider, for example, the long-standing international law rule that prohibits State
A from unilaterally accessing property in State B, absent State B's consent. Such a rule
makes good sense for tangible, non-divisible property. The prospect of foreign law
enforcement officials surreptitiously crossing a border to search one's property-or
even worse, seize it and spirit it back across the border-is concerning. Such a system
runs counter to principles of democratic accountability, undercuts the rule of law, and
almost certainly creates international conflict given the prospect of two different
sovereigns claiming interest in the same, non-divisible piece of property.
To avoid these problems, both domestic and international rules require that, as a
general matter, U.S. law enforcement employ what is known as "mutual legal assistance
process" (MLA) if it seeks property in another country. This process entails U.S. law
enforcement making a diplomatic request to the foreign government for the property.
The foreign government then assesses the request, and if it deems the request appropri-
ate, accesses the property according to its own rules and procedures. The same goes
for foreign law enforcement seeking data in the United States.
But data is different than other forms of tangible property in three key ways:
* First, data can be accessed without any state agent-or third-party acting on
the behest of the state-crossing a border. This means there is no physical,
tangible entry by foreign law enforcement or any agent of foreign law enforce-
ment in the accessing of data across borders. There may still be an intrusion,
but it is not a physical, tangible one.
* Second, data can be copied, with the original left intact-still available for
use by the data subject (the individual with a possessory and privacy interest
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in the data) and still available to be accessed by the host state. The divisibility
of data thus reduces the concern about friction resulting from two sovereigns
seeking control over a singular piece of indivisible property.
* Third, and critically, the mobility of data coupled with the fact of third-party
control means that there may be no connection between the location of the data
and the foreign government, other than the fact that a third-party chose to place
it there. As a result, there is no principle of democratic accountability protected
by a rule that delimits jurisdiction based on location. There also might not be
any link between the location of the data and the key sovereign interests that
the jurisdictional rules regarding enforcement are largely meant to protect-
namely, the sovereign interest in prosecuting criminal activity with a territorial
nexus and the sovereign interest in protecting one's own citizens and residents.
Together, these factors make data location a particularly poor basis for delimiting
law enforcement access. Such a rule will inevitably be both over and under-inclusive-
granting governments control over data in which they have no legitimate interest and
precluding governmental access to data in which they have legitimate interests simply
because of a third-party decision to move it across territorial borders.
What is instead needed is a set of rules that better reflects the key interests at stake:
rules that ensure the United States and other countries can regulate access to their own
residents and citizens data, consistent with principles of democratic accountability
and consistent with the sovereign interest in protecting the privacy interests of one's
own residents and citizens. Rules also should ensure that such access is conditioned
on respect for the rule of law and pursuant to baseline substantive and procedural
protections designed to protect privacy and prevent abuse.
In what follows, I suggest ways to amend the SCA in light of this reality-starting
first with the question of law enforcement access to extraterritorially-located data,
and second, turning to the issue of foreign law enforcement to U.S.-held data.
II. A MICROSOFT IRELAND SOLUTION
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act's (ECPA) s silence as to the territorial
reach of the government's warrant authority means that the Supreme Court must divine
the 1986 Congress's intent. In so doing, it will be presented with one of two stark
choices: either the warrant authority reaches all U.S.-controlled data, regardless of
location or other potentially relevant considerations; or it reaches only that data that
happens to be located within the territorial boundaries of the United States. Neither
answer is satisfactory.
Rather than leave the issue to the Court to work out, Congress should now step in
and clarify the territorial scope-as numerous judges have urged.16 In fact, even the
is The SCA was enacted as Title II of ECPA.
16 See, e.g., In re Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail, 829 E3d. 197, 233 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., con-
curring) ("Although I believe that we have reached the correct result as a matter of interpreting the statute
before us, I believe even more strongly that the statute should be revised..."); In re Warrant to Search Certain
E-Mail, 855 E3d at 55 (Carney, J., concurring) (urging Congress to act); see also id. at 62 (Jacobs, J., dis-
senting) (noting the possibility of congressional action); id. at 68 (Cabranes, J., dissenting) (same).
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companies litigating the cases recognize that this is a matter better left for Congress.17
A legislation solution should reflect the following three key principles:
First, U.S. law enforcement access to stored communications content should not
turn on the happenstance of where it is held. This is a particularly poor basis for delim-
iting law enforcement jurisdiction. It means that U.S. law enforcement will be unable
to access sought-after data in the investigation of serious crime, even in situations where
the target and victim are both U.S. citizens, and even if the place where the data is
located has absolutely no connection to the case or individuals being investigated.
Second, U.S. law enforcement should be required to obtain a warrant to compel
production of communications content, regardless of where it is held, even if it is
located overseas. 1 This is something that is required by the Sixth Circuit" and is
done by the executive branch as a matter of practice, but is not required by statute.
The SCA's outmoded distinctions based on type of service provider and length of time
of storage-pursuant to which data stored 180 days or less is protected by the warrant
requirement but data stored longer is not-should be eliminated. 20
Third, U.S. law should respect the legitimate interests of foreign governments in
delimiting access to data of their own citizens and residents-much as the United
States correctly insists on when foreign governments seek the data of U.S. citizens and
residents. This is important as a means of standard setting-something that will
ultimately inure to the benefit of U.S. citizens and residents. As the home to some of
the world's largest tech companies that control so much of the world's communications
content, this may not seem particularly important now. But as foreign-based companies
gain a greater share of the market, it will be increasingly important to put in place
protections that ensure respect for U.S. rules governing access to U.S. person data. It
is also a means of protecting U.S. companies and thus the economy. Rightly or wrongly,
much of the rest of the world fears what they see as pervasive U.S. surveillance. A rule
that permits U.S. law enforcement to access U.S.-held data anywhere around the world,
without regard to any countervailing considerations, feeds into these fears and makes
it harder for U.S.-based service providers to compete globally. The Microsoft Ireland
case-and the way in which the issue ultimately gets resolved-is being watched not
just in the United States, but all around the world precisely for this reason.
The recently introduced International Communications Privacy Act (ICPA) is a
good place to start.21 It requires a warrant for all stored communications content,
shifts the focus away from the location of the data to the nationality and location of
17 See, e.g., Facilitating Cooperation and Protecting Rights: Hearing on Law Enforcement Access
to Data Stored Across Borders Before the Subcomm. On Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of Brad Smith), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/
doc/05-24-17%20Smith%20Testimony.PDF (emphasizing that "litigation is not a substitute for policy-
making" and urging Congress to update ECPA); Br. in Opposition, supra note 5, at 3 ("Congress alone
has the authority and the institutional competence to craft a new legislative scheme for a world not an-
ticipated in 1986."); Kent Walker, Digital Security and Due Process: A New Legal Framework for the
Cloud Era, The Keyword (June 22, 2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/public-policy/
digital-security-and-due-process-new-legal-framework-cloud-era/.
s If, as Microsoft contends, the SCA only regulates domestic stored communications, its protections
(including the warrant requirement) would not extend to data that is stored outside the United States. See
In re Warrant to Search Certain E-Mail, 855 E3d at 73 (Raggi, J., dissenting) (warning that "the same rea-
soning that leads the panel to conclude that 5 2703(a) warrants cannot reach communications that Microsoft
has stored in Ireland might also preclude affording 5 2702(a) privacy protections to such materials.")
19 Warshak, 631 F.3d at 288.
20 See 18 U.S.C. 55 2703(a)-(b) (2012).
21 S. 1671, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017); H.R. 5323, 114th Cong. (2d Sess. 2017).
5 2 HOW/10
the target, and seeks to accommodate-on a reciprocal basis-foreign governments'
interests in protecting the data of their own citizens and residents. That said, it does
so through a complicated and cumbersome scheme that only comes into play if and
when a foreign government seeking the data of a U.S. citizen or legal permanent resi-
dent self-certifies that it will, among other things, provide reciprocal notice and an
opportunity to object, and the Attorney General and Secretary of State determine that
a number of conditions are met.22 As a practical matter, the list of so-called "qualify-
ing foreign governments" is likely to be null, or at least very small, in the short to
medium term. The legislation also somewhat unusually gives qualifying countries an
opportunity to come to U.S. court and effectively move to quash the warrant.23
Such a scheme should be supplemented-and perhaps replaced-with a require-
ment that courts do a comity analysis any time the U.S. government is knowingly
seeking the data of a foreigner located outside the United States and that request creates
a conflict of laws. This would codify something that is now done as a matter of discre-
tion, ensuring that such judicial review takes place and codifying the factors the court
must consider in issuing the warrant, including the location of the crime, victim, and
alleged perpetrator; the seriousness of the crime; the importance of the data to the
investigation of the crime; the possibility of accessing the data via other means; U.S.
interest in prosecuting the offense; and the relevant foreign governmental interest.
An alternative, broader proposal would require such comity analysis any time the
U.S. government is knowingly seeking the data of a foreigner located outside the United
States, without regard to the question of whether there is a conflict of laws. In such a
situation, the courts would then take into account the existence (or not) of such con-
flicts. This has the advantage of ensuring that potential foreign government interests
are taken into account in all situations in which the United States is seeking the data
of a foreigner outside the United States. However, it has the arguable disadvantage of
putting an additional burden on the requesting law enforcement officials and courts
that are then required to do the comity analysis in a broader number of cases.
Importantly, either scheme would require such a comity analysis in all situations
in which the United States is seeking the data of a non-citizen located outside the
United States and the relevant conditions apply, irrespective of any separate executive
branch agreement on reciprocal notice and opportunity to object. Such a mechanism
would ensure that the interests of foreign governments are considered, thus setting a
precedent that the United States would want and expect other countries to engage in
if accessing the data of U.S. citizens and residents. It would also address concerns
about unbounded U.S. surveillance.
At the same time, it would protect the interests of the United States in getting access
to data in serious cases. It would avoid giving foreign governments a right to access
U.S. courts or hold up issuance of warrants in legitimate cases, and it would not in
any way preclude the United States from negotiating the kind of agreements provided
for in ICPA-requiring reciprocal notice and an opportunity to object-anytime the
United States determined it was in its interest to do so.
22 S. 1671 5 3, 115th Cong. (1st Sess. 2017). Among other things, the Attorney General, in consulta-
tion with the Secretary of State, must determine that the foreign country "affords robust substantive
and procedural protections for privacy and civil liberties" and "adheres to applicable international
human rights statutes."
23 Id. Additionally, the legislation fails to specify who is to be provided notice if the target is a foreign
citizen of State A located in State B. Is it State B or State A or both?
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In sum, Congress can and should step in now to ensure that the relevant interests
are taken into account by adopting the kind of nuanced solution that Congress, not
courts, is equipped to provide.
III. FOREIGN GOVERNMENT ACCESS
The problem of foreign government access is the exact converse of the problem
presented by the Second Circuit's ruling in the Microsoft Ireland case. It, too, has
roots in the SCA-stemming from provisions that prohibit U.S.-based providers from
disclosing communications content to foreign law enforcement.2 4 This prohibition
applies even if law enforcement is seeking the email account of a foreigner located
outside the United States in the investigation of a solely foreign crime. Because U.S.-
based providers now control so much of the world's data, and because so much infor-
mation is now digitalized, this has become an increasingly potent problem for foreign
law enforcement.
The Obama and Trump administrations have proposed almost identical legislation
to begin to address the concerns of foreign governments.2 5 The legislation would
amend the SCA to permit foreign governments in specified circumstances to directly
access the content of communications from U.S.-based providers. Specifically, it would
permit the executive branch to enter into agreements with partner governments that
would permit those governments to directly request specified communications content
from U.S.-based providers, subject to a number of limitations.
The draft legislation includes three key sets of conditions on how these agreements
would be operationalized:
First, there are limits on the kinds of countries that could be eligible for these
expedited data-sharing agreements. Such agreements only would be permitted with
respect to countries that have been certified by the Attorney General, in conjunction
with the Secretary of State, as affording "robust substantive and procedural protec-
tions for privacy and civil liberties" with respect to data collection and the other
activities subject to the agreement. This helps protect against foreign governments
gaining access to data in order to harass or otherwise abuse.
Second, there are several procedural and substantive requirements that must be
met regarding the substance of each request made pursuant to such a system.
The partner government could not directly access the data of a U.S. citizen or
legal permanent resident or any person located in the United States, those
requests would still need to be made through the MLA process. This reflects
the principle that U.S. law should govern access to the data of U.S. citizens,
legal permanent residents, and persons located in the United States. Conversely,
U.S. law should not control foreign government collection of information on
foreigners outside the United States, so long as the foreign government satisfies
minimum procedural and substantive standards in the way it accesses, pro-
cesses, and uses such data.
Various measures are in place to further protect data of U.S. persons (defined
to include citizens and legal permanent residents) and others in the United
24 As with questions of a U.S. warrant's reach, there is an open question as to whether the SCA ap-
plies to all data held by U.S.-based companies or only data that happens to be located in the United States.
According to the Second Circuit's reasoning, it would be the latter. In re Warrant to Search A Certain
E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft, 829 F. 3d. 197, 222 (2d Cir. 2016).
2s Testimony by Downing, supra note 13.
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States: First, the foreign government could not target a non-U.S. person with
the purpose of obtaining data concerning a U.S. person or other person
located in the United States. Second, the foreign government would be pro-
hibited from disseminating content of a U.S. person to a U.S. authority unless
it relates to significant harm or threat of such harm to the U.S. or U.S. persons.
Third, non-relevant data, including data of U.S. persons, must be sealed,
segregated, and deleted.
* Requests must be particularized, lawful, and based on articulable and cred-
ible facts, and they must be reviewed or overseen by a court or other inde-
pendent authority.
* Intercept orders must be of a fixed, limited duration and permitted only when
that same information could not be obtained by a less intrusive method.
* Acquired data must also be subject to minimization procedures, including
requirements that non-relevant information be sealed, segregated, and deleted.
* Acquired data cannot be used to infringe freedom of speech.
Third, the draft legislation imposes accountability and review mechanisms.
Specifically, agreements would be a maximum of five-years in duration, unless renewed.
Partner governments must provide for periodic compliance reviews by the United
States, and the United States reserves the right to rescind any aspect of the agreement
for which compliance is lacking. The draft legislation also specifies that the U.S. must
be granted a reciprocal right of access to foreign-held data.
This DOJ-proposed legislation is not perfect and would benefit from some modi-
fications. Specifically, the legislation should explicitly require judicial "authorization"
as opposed to "review or oversight" of compulsion orders for content. It should provide
for enhanced accountability and transparency mechanisms, by, among other things,
requiring governments to publish data on the number and type of requests made pur-
suant to these agreements. It should require partner countries to explicitly disavow
data localization mandates. And it should provide an explicit mechanism that permits
third-party providers to submit requests to the U.S. government for additional review
if there are questions about whether or not the requirements are met-and be protected
from foreign government compliance demands in the interim.
But it is, in general, an approach to be applauded, as I and numerous others have
urged elsewhere.2 6 It reflects the normative position that foreign governments should
be able to access their own citizens' and nationals' data, so long as they abide by
" See, e.g., David Kris, U.S. Government Presents Draft Legislation for Cross-Border Data Requests,
LAWFARE (July 16, 2016, 8:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/us-government-presents-draft-leg-
islation-cross-border-data-requests; Testimony, Brad Smith, supra note 17; Walker, supra note 17; Tiffany
Lin & Mailyn Fidler, Cross-Border Data Access Reform: A Primer on the Proposed U.S.-U.K Agreement
8, Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society (Sep. 7, 2017) (concluding that, despite concerns, "the
proposed legislation could be a huge step forward in updating an outdated system that was not designed
for the today's technological paradigm and was not built for such a high volume of requests"), http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:33867385. Jennifer Daskal & Andrew K. Woods, Congress
Should Embrace the DOJ's Cross-Border Fix, JusT SECURITY (Aug. 1, 2016, 8:03 AM), https://www.
justsecurity.org/32213/congress-embrace-dojs-cross-border-data-fix/; Facilitating Cooperation and
Protecting Rights: Hearing on Law Enforcement Access to Data Stored Across Borders Before the
Subcomm. On Crime and Terrorism of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 115th Cong. (2017) (statement
of Jennifer Daskal), https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/05-24-17%2ODaskal%20
Testimony.pdf. See Peter Swire and Deven Desai, A 'Qualified SPOC'Approach for India and Mutual
Legal Assistance, LAWFARE (Mar. 2, 2017, 12:14 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/qualified-spoc-
approach-india-and-mutual-legal-assistance (suggesting a mechanism for expanding agreements to a
wider range of countries).
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baseline requirements in how they access and manage data. And it lays out with speci-
ficity the procedural and substantive standards that are required, using U.S. leverage
as the repository of so much of the world's data as an incentive for partner nations to
comply. This is important. These are standards that ultimately protect U.S. persons
in addition to their foreign counterparts with whom they are in communication.
Meanwhile, it ensures that U.S. standards continue to apply to the direct collection of
data from U.S. persons and residents.
The United States and United Kingdom reportedly have drafted an agreement that
comports with these requirements, although the agreement cannot be implemented
until the U.S. Congress first amends the SCA to permit these types of agreements to
go forward.
Some have objected to this agreement on the grounds that it would permit foreign
governments to bypass the mutual legal assistance process. In particular, some have
expressed concern that these agreements permit access upon a showing of a "reasonable
justification based on articulable and credible facts," as compared to the "probable
cause" standard that is now demanded when a U.S. warrant is obtained. 27 As an initial
matter, it is not obvious that the "reasonable justification based on articulable and
credible facts" standard is in fact lower than-and certainly not significantly lower
than-that of probable cause. 28 But even if the critics are correct, it is not clear why
the United States should insist on imposing its particular, and idiosyncratic, probable
cause standard, so long as sufficient substantive and procedural standards are in place.
Continued insistence on the probable cause standard-a standard that makes little
sense to the rest of the world-is likely to doom such agreements, thus further feeding
the incentives for data localization mandates and other surreptitious means of accessing
data. If that happens, the United States will have no say in the standards that are applied.
Critics also worry that there are insufficient protections for U.S. person informa-
tion. 29 But this critique fails to account for the significant protections in place for U.S.
person information-including the limits on both direct and indirect targeting of U.S.
person information, the restrictions on dissemination of U.S. person information, and
the auditing that is required. And it too reflects a misguided assumption that the status
quo is permanent. If we instead move to a world in which foreign governments access
such data unilaterally (either via data localization mandates, extraterritorial claims
that prevail, or surreptitious means) none of these protections for U.S. person data
will be put in place.
Importantly, the legislation reflects an attempt by the United States to use its cur-
rent leverage as the home for so much of the world's data to insist on-and ideally
raise-baseline substantive and procedural baseline protections. And in fact, the inter-
actions with the U.K. suggest that such benefits are possible. As the negotiations over
this draft agreement were ongoing, the U.K. government passed new legislation that,
for the first time in U.K. history, provides for judicial oversight of warrants for
2 See, e.g., Center for Democracy & Technology, "Cross-Border Law Enforcement Demands: Analysis
of the US Department of Justice's Proposed Bill" (Aug. 17, 2016), https://cdt.org/files/2016/08/DOJ-Cross-
Border-Bill-Insight- FINAL2.pdf; ACLU, Amnesty International, and HRW Letter Opposing Department
of Justice Proposal on Cross Border Data Sharing (Aug. 9, 2016), https://www.aclu.org/letter/
aclu-amnesty-international-usa-and-hrw-letter-opposing-doj -proposal-cross-border-data-sharing.
21 See, e.g., U.S. v. Ortiz, 669 E3d 439, 446 (4th Cir. 2012) (probable cause requires nothing more than
a "reasonable ground"-which is "less demanding than a standard requiring a preponderance of the evi-
dence for the belief"); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32 (1983) (defining probable case as a "practical,
non-technical standard" that turns on the "assessment of probabilities") (citations omitted).
29 See ACLU, Amnesty International, and HRW, Letter, supra note 27.
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communications content.3 0 The U.K. government reportedly endorsed such judicial
review provisions because it, among other reasons, wanted to meet the judicial review
standards demanded by the United States.
In sum, the draft legislation is something that should be pursued, albeit with some
improvement. It relies on the United States' unique position as the home of the world's
largest tech companies to set baseline substantive and procedural standards governing
the collection of data-ideally helping to elevate the standards that apply. The genera-
tion of such standards will ultimately inure to the benefit of U.S. citizens and residents
that may be subject to foreign government collection of their data. But this is a time-
limited opportunity. As foreign-based service providers gain increasing shares of the
market and foreign governments successfully impose data localization mandates,
foreign governments will be able to access sought-after data locally-without ever
having to make cross-border requests to the United States. The United States then will
have little to nothing to say about the standards that apply, even with respect to the
U.S. person data that is stored in foreign jurisdictions and either directly or incidentally
collected by foreign governments. This would be an unfortunate result.
CONCLUSION
Governments increasingly need digital evidence that is located across borders in
the investigation of local crime. The rules have not yet caught up to that reality.
Congress has a critically important role to play in revising those rules-and doing so
in a way that accommodates the relevant security, privacy, sovereignty, and economic
interests at stake. This is not an issue that should be delegated to the Supreme Court,
which is not in the position to address the complicated interests at stake with the kind
of nuance they deserve. Several judges and other commentators have urged the same.3 2
The time to act is now.
30 See Investigatory Powers Act 2016 c. 25 (Eng.), 5 23, http://www.1egislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2016/25/
pdfs/ukpga_20160025_en.pdf. While the legislation has been defined as a "snoopers charter" that au-
thorizes broad-based surveillance the addition of judicial review procedures is an example of an additional
check on U.K. authorities that had not previously been in place. Id.
31 For a more in-depth analysis of this issue, see Jennifer Daskal, Law Enforcement Access to Data
Across Borders: The Evolving Security and Rights Issues, 8 J. NAT'L SECURITY L. & POL'Y 473 (2016).
32 In re Warrant to Search A Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and Maintained by Microsoft, 829
E3d at 222 (2d Cir. 2016) (Lynch, J., concurring (emphasizing the "the need for congressional action to
revise a badly outdated statute"); In re Warrant to Search A Certain E-Mail Account Controlled and
Maintained by Microsoft, 855 E3d at 55 (2d Cir. 2017) (Carney, J., concurring in the order denying rehear-
ing en banc) (arguing that the SCA is "overdue for a congressional revision that would continue to protect
privacy but would more effectively balance concerns of international comity with law enforcement needs
and service provider obligations in the global context in which this case arose"); Brad Smith, U.S. Supreme
Court Will Hear Petition to Review Microsoft Search Warrant Case While Momentum to Modernize the
Law Continues in Congress, MICROSOFT ON THE ISSUES (Oct. 16, 2017), https://blogs.microsoft.com/on-
the-i ssues/2017/10/16/us-supreme-court-will-hea r-petition-to-review-micro soft- search-warra nt-ca se-while-
momentum-to-modernize-the-law-continues-in-congress/; Kent Walker, Digital security and due process:
A new legal framework for the cloud era, GOOGLE BLOG (June 22, 2017), https://www.blog.google/topics/
public-policy/digital-security-and-due-process-new-legal-framework-cloud-era/. See also Jennifer Daskal,
There's No Good Decision in the Next Big Data Privacy Case, N.Y TIMES (Oct. 18, 2017), https://www.
nytimes.com/2017/10/18/opinion/data-abroad-privacy-court.html.
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